Publications | PhD Dissertation
Predators and Prey, Victorian Journal of Arts, Volume 10, Issue 1, January 2017, pp. 130--142.
Macroeconomic Stabilization When the Natural Real Interest Rate Is Falling, Journal of Economic Education, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2015, pp. 376--393.
(Also available here.)
A Simple Treatment of the Liquidity Trap for Intermediate Macroeconomics Courses, Journal of Economic Education, Volume 45, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 36--55.
(Also available here.)
The final triumph of Adam Smith? (book review) Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology, Volume 26-A, 2008, pp. 109–116
The effect of labor market monopsony on economic growth, Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 30, Issue 4, December 2008, pp. 1446--1467. (With Tavis Barr)
International Trade and the Value of Time, Review of International Economics, Vol. 13, No. 4, September 2005, pp. 757--769.
Fiscal Policy, Long-Run Growth and Welfare in a Stock-Flow Model of Public Goods, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 37, No. 3, August 2004, pp. 742--756. (With Sugata Ghosh)
Optimal Growth with Public Capital and Public Services, Economics of Planning, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2002, pp. 271--292. (With Sugata Ghosh)
Vertical Product Differentiation and the Value of Time, International Economic Journal, Vol. 12, No. 3, Autumn 1998, pp. 97--111.
Economic Growth with Negative Externalities in Innovation, Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 1997, pp. 155--173.
Intra-Industry Competitiveness and Economic Growth, Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 49, No. 2, March/April 1997, pp. 117--125.
Job Rotation and Public Policy: Theory with Applications to Japan and the USA, International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 15, No. 6, 1994, pp. 57--71. (With Panos Mourdoukoutas.)
Abstract: A high level of job rotation is a distinctive feature of the Japanese employment system. Frequent worker reassignments from one job to another is far more common in Japan than in the United States. We argue that this difference in job mobility rates reflects, in part, the differences in social policies towards displaced labor in the two countries. Japanese policies encourage anticipatory job mobility while American policies do not. Our arguments are made within a simple two-period general equilibrium model of a perfectively competitive economy with incomplete insurance markets. We also showed that Japanese-style government subsidies designed to encourage job rotation are inefficient. Laissez Faire is not efficient either, however, and public provision of insurance against loss of income can yield a Pareto improvement.
Chapter 1. Labor productivity varies from country to country. Therefore, the value of time, or the income forgone during the time spent on consumption varies too. Such variations, which play no role in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, are shown to carry new implications about (i) the sources of gains from trade and (ii) the factors determining the pattern of trade. It is shown that there may be no trade between two countries even if their per capita capital stocks are different. Moreover, if there is trade, the capital-rich country may export the labor-intensive good, and vice versa. It is also shown that the issues of gains from trade and the pattern of trade are equivalent when properly framed. (A revised version of this chapter has been published in the Review of International Economics.)
Chapter 2. In this model there are goods of different qualities. The poorer country exports the superior variety to the richer country because the richer country can afford the superior variety. The richer country exports an inferior variety because that is what the poorer country can afford.
Assuming that superior varieties are more capital-intensive than inferior varieties, one sees that the country with the higher per capita capital stock (i.e., the richer country) exports--to the country with the lower per capita capital stock (i.e., poorer country)--the inferior variety which is labor intensive, thereby reversing the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade pattern. (A revised version of this chapter has been published in the International Economic Journal.)
Chapter 3. Most of the recent work on the theory of economic growth incorporates knowledge spillovers. Such spillovers imply underinvestment. In this chapter, technological progress is modelled as a sequence of patent races. This raises the possibility of overinvestment. If a competitor wins the patent, one's own research efforts are wasted. Such waste intensifies as the number of competitors in a patent race increases. Each research firm ignores the negative externality it inflicts on others and consequently overinvests. (A revised version of this chapter has been published in the Journal of Macroeconomics.)
[Udayan Roy] [Economics Department] [College of Liberal Arts and Sciences] [LIU Post] [LIU]